Given the social nature of LIS practice and its concern with knowledge, some have argued that social epistemology – which shifts the focus of epistemology from individualistic to social – should serve as its philosophical foundation.

This view has been challenged partly on the basis that social epistemology is necessarily normative with respect to knowledge while LIS is not. That is, social epistemology aims to evaluate knowledge-related social practices and make prescriptions about what counts as knowledge, while LIS does and should not.

In this seminar, I will look at this debate in detail, examine the nature of normativity in LIS and argue that LIS can and should be epistemically normative. From this, I will show, it follows that any philosophical foundation for LIS must draw on — and contribute to — research in social epistemology.

About the Speaker

Dominic Dixon is a Research Librarian at the University of Cambridge and is carrying out doctoral research at CityLIS, looking at the relationship between philosophy and LIS.